Reward-based crowdfunding campaigns are commonly offered in one of two models. The "Keep-It-All" (KIA) model involves the entrepreneurial firm setting a fundraising goal and keeping the entire amount raised, regardless of whether or not they meet their goal, thereby allocating the risk to the crowd when an underfunded project goes ahead. The "All-Or-Nothing" (AON) model involves the entrepreneurial firm setting a fundraising goal and keeping nothing unless the goal is achieved, thereby shifting the risk to the entrepreneur. We show that small, scalable projects are more likely to be funded through the KIA scheme, while large non-scalable projects are more likely to be funded through the AON scheme. Overall, KIA campaigns are less successful in meeting their fundraising goals, consistent with a risk-return tradeoff for entrepreneurs, where opting for the KIA scheme represents less risk and less return for the entrepreneur.
INTRODUCTION
The rise of crowdfunding has been facilitated by standardized Internet platforms that act as two-sided markets through the participation of a large crowd. They enable clear mechanisms through which individuals can provide money for or even invest in early-stage entrepreneurial firms (Mollick, 2014b; Belleflamme et al., 2013 Belleflamme et al., , 2014 . There is growing literature on the network effects that may result from the participation of a large crowd. While understanding how crowdfunding platforms work has attracted increasing interest from research scholars, recent research is inconclusive about network benefits arising from the crowd (Bayus, 2013; Boudreau and Jeppesen, 2014) , partly because the incentives and motivations among different individuals is heterogeneous (Belenzon and Schankerman, 2015) . In this paper, we provide new theory and evidence on how the design of the crowdfunding mechanism itself can influence the networked risks and benefits associated with participation in the crowd.
Kickstarter and Indiegogo are reward-based crowdfunding platforms whereby entrepreneurs state capital raising goals, and, in exchange, individuals are offered a reward for participating. 1 In most cases, the reward is the product that is eventually produced by the entrepreneur with the money raised during the campaign. In practice, two types of platforms have emerged: "AllOr-Nothing" (AON), and "Keep-It-All" (KIA). In the AON model, entrepreneurial firms set a capital-raising goal below which the entrepreneurial firm does not keep any of the pledged funds, and the crowd does not get any reward. In the KIA model, by contrast, the entrepreneurial firm can keep the entire pledged amount, albeit at higher fees, as explained further herein, regardless of whether or not the stated capital raising goal is reached. In this paper, we consider whether the differences in these two fundraising models give rise to differences in the types of firms that select a particular model, their eventual likelihood of success, and the sensitivity of investors to information released by the entrepreneurial firms.
From a managerial perspective, these issues are crucial for understanding how networks such 1 Other forms of crowdfunding platforms exist, such as equity-, loan-and donation-based platforms. These platforms attract different types of crowdfunders, since incentives to participate are not based on receiving a product.
as crowdfunding platforms can contribute to obtaining necessary resources to transform innovative ideas into products.
We conjecture that entrepreneurs that self-select into the AON model do so in order to signal to the crowd that they are committed to only undertake the project if enough capital is raised, which reduces the crowd's risk that undercapitalized projects will be undertaken, as under the KIA model. As such, AON projects are expected to be larger and more successful. By contrast, KIA projects will be selected by entrepreneurs who can scale their project (i.e., a portion of the planned project is feasible) at a level that individuals still get utility from the reward under a scaled-down format (knowing that they will lose the entire utility if the project is canceled). This may occur if the degree of underfunding is not excessive so that the crowd avoids bearing too much risk of not receiving anything. Similarly, entrepreneurs with projects with few fixed costs of production are more likely to use the KIA model, since the absence of fixed costs makes it easy to undertake the projects on a smaller scale than when fixed costs are important. These predictions are consistent with a risk-return tradeoff at the entrepreneurial level, in which selecting the KIA model represents less risk but also lower returns (lower chances of obtaining the needed funds) for the entrepreneur, while the AON model has more risk taken by the entrepreneur but higher chances of successful funding. Thus, the KIA model, while offering an overall lower chance of success, may be optimal for risk-averse entrepreneurs, particularly if the higher risk involved in AON is not compensated by sufficiently higher success chances.
To test these propositions, we extracted a sample of 22,850 fundraising campaigns from the (median of $10,000). AON campaigns had an average completion ratio (i.e., the ratio of total pledges over goal, in a percentage) of 64%, while KIA campaigns had a completion ratio of 42%.
Put differently, 34% of all AON campaigns were successfully completed (i.e., they had a completion ratio of 100% or higher), while only 17% of all KIA campaigns achieved their funding goals. AON campaigns had on average 189 backers (median 43), while KIA campaigns on average attracted 76 backers (median 33).
The data further indicate that there is a negative relationship between the funding goal and usage of the KIA model, in line with the prediction that the AON model constitutes a commitment device and thus reduces risk to the crowd, as underfunded projects will not be undertaken under with AON. Consistent with existing studies on crowdfunding success (Mollick, 2014a; Belleflamme et al., 2013 Belleflamme et al., , 2014 Mollick and Kuppuswamy, 2014) , campaigns with larger fundraising goals are less successful. Controlling for size differences, our data indicate AON campaigns are more likely to achieve their goal, despite the fact that their goals are larger on average. Taken together, these results are consistent with the view that the usage of AON is a clear signal to the crowd that the entrepreneur commits not to undertake the project if not enough is raised, which represents a potential cost to the entrepreneur who may not be able to undertake the project. The AON model therefore reduces the risk to the crowd, thereby enabling the AON entrepreneurial firms to set higher goals, raise more money, and be more likely to reach their stated goals. Opting for the AON model allows entrepreneurs to alleviate constraints on their fundraising goals induced by the negative impact of funding goals on success. In contrast, KIA projects tend to be less successful in general, despite their lower goals, when compared to AON campaigns. Under a KIA campaign, the crowd bears the risk that an entrepreneurial firm undertakes a project that is underfunded and, hence, more likely to eventually fail, making the crowd more reluctant to pledge. However, these conclusions do not imply that AON is systemically superior, since AON entails significantly higher risk for the entrepreneur. Thus, our findings support the view that entrepreneurs on Indiegogo are often willing to reduce their own risk by opting for a KIA model at the expense of achieving higher funding amounts. These findings are robust to a number of specification tests, including controls for the endogenous choice of the fundraising goal and propensity score matching.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section provides information on the structure of the Indiegogo platform. Our theoretical predictions are thereafter explained and summarized. The subsequent sections introduce the data and provide empirical tests. A discussion and concluding remarks are provided in the last section. To sum up, two important decisions must be considered by the entrepreneur when setting up his/her campaign: the funding structure (AON versus KIA model) and the fundraising goal.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE INDIEGOGO PLATFORM
These two variables are set simultaneously at the beginning of the campaign and are, therefore, potentially endogenous, as we discuss and control for in our empirical analyses below.
Each project also indicates a reward scale. The entrepreneur sets one or more pledge levels (based on amount to pledge) for which he or she will offer different rewards to the backers.
The entrepreneur freely defines the reward amounts and steps, and the number of reward levels. Rewards offered can be as simple as a "thank you" on the project page or as important as a key decision in the project development. Usually, the main reward offered is the project's main product combined with some extras (dedication, personalization, etc.). Moreover, some rewards can be available only in a limited quantity (limited editions of the product, a special discount for early backers, etc.). The entrepreneur also indicates a provisional date for the reward to be delivered. These rewards offer no legal obligation for the entrepreneur or guarantee for the backers, even in case of project success.
Beside this hard information, Indiegogo also permits an entrepreneur to provide 'soft' information about his or her project. Some information is needed for the index pages, where projects are listed as standardized "projects cards" (a small image, the campaign title, and a short description with a maximum of 160 characters, the category, and the origin country and city). Other project descriptions will only appear on the project main page: the full project description with no limit in length or form (and which can (the number of clicks on shared links from external social networks), and the number of comments he or she has made on an actual or previous campaigns.
Some of the information flow accrues only over time. While hard information is provided at the beginning of any campaign, the entrepreneur can update the project page with soft information during and after the campaign, notably by posting comments. However, visitors and backers are also allowed to post comments or questions, which facilitates interaction with the entrepreneur. Complementary data will also be provided all along the crowdfunding process by the platform and backers. The page will also be automatically updated to provide information about enrolled backers with pledges made for the different rewards offered, the campaign's remaining time, and the overall progress towards the goal.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Prior empirical and theoretical work on crowdfunding has focused on the factors that affect success on crowdfunding platforms that only offer AON crowdfunding, such as Kickstarter; see Mollick (2014a) , Belleflamme et al. (2014) , Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) and Colombo et al. (2014) . Related studies on crowdfunding have examined equity crowdfunding (Ahlers et al., 2015; Cumming and Johan, 2013; Schwienbacher, 2014a, 2014b) .
Our theoretical setting differs from prior work by examining the different types of rewardbased crowdfunding models and the role of model choice as a signal in the crowdfunding campaign. While most of these studies focus on crowd and project characteristics, such as gender (Greenberg and Mollick, 2014) or geographical origin (Agrawal et al., 2015, Lin and Viswanathan, 2014) , our contribution lies in examining the drivers of the entrepreneurial decision in the design of the crowdfunding campaign and its impact on the crowd's willingness to pledge money and, thus, the ultimate campaign outcome.
We assume entrepreneurs and the crowd are both risk averse. Expected utility is a function of the project, the reward, the cost of participation, the risks of the project not being undertaken, and the risks of the project not succeeding on the condition of being undertaken.
Using a theoretical framework of information aggregation, Hakenes and Schlegel (2014) show that the level of funding goals set in AON crowdfunding campaigns helps to attract a larger crowd. They consider equity-and loan-based crowdfunding where the crowd makes financial decisions. In the context of reward-based crowdfunding, by contrast, the crowd does not make investment decisions but rather consumption-based decisions. However, part of the intuition developed there is useful in our context. In Hakenes and Schlegel, the level of the funding goal serves as a tool to aggregate vague information that each investor has. By imposing an AON model, individual investors are more likely to invest, despite the availability of only vague information, since they know they will become a crowdfunder to the project if many other crowdfunders with similarly vague information also contribute. In the case of reward-based crowdfunding, the level of the funding goal serves a costly mechanism that ensures that the entrepreneur will limit the risk faced by the crowd only by starting the project with sufficient financial resources. This maximizes the chances that the entrepreneur will be able to deliver the promised reward to the crowdfunders.
Furthermore, some crowdfunders may prefer to back an "underdog" since "warm-glow" feelings may be worth more to some people than a reward such as a name listed on a company website, for instance (McGinnis and Gentry, 2009 Generally, entrepreneurs who are in the market for crowdfunding are capital constrained and unable to make up funding shortfalls. At least, given the uncertainty with the possibility of a funding shortfall and the magnitude of the shortfall, there is no way for the entrepreneur to credibly signal to the crowd that he or she will make up the difference with other sources of funding. Entrepreneurs are not likely to be successful crowdfunders at all if they advertise that they have lots of money from other sources and do not need the pledges from the crowd.
The risk to the crowd of starting a project with insufficient resources is mitigated if the project is scalable. We expect that entrepreneurs involved in scalable projects are more likely to seek KIA funding since they are able to produce output even when they obtain only partial funding. A project can be considered as scalable in two ways, either because the output or costs are scalable. The first case is when the entrepreneur is able to reduce the costs by removing some features to the goods. Examples of projects that can be scaled back this way include books (one can generate a subset of the chapters or a comic book without color); music albums with fewer tracks than expected; video games with fewer levels and less options (less items, no digital voices, or less sophisticated graphics); and non-profit ventures (charity, whereby 'any amount is welcome'). In the second case, scalable projects are characterized by having little or no fixed, incompressible costs that need to be shared among a larger number of crowdfunders. Projects with absolutely no fixed costs can be started with any number of backers, as long as the required pledge covers the product's marginal cost of production.
Backers contribute capital if the utility associated with the funded project and reward outweighs the pledged contribution (Belleflamme et al., 2014) , even in case of a scaled-back product. Projects based on material goods (like 3D-glasses, a health-monitoring watch, a new restaurant, etc.) without scalable output are less likely to opt for a KIA campaigns. Indeed, projects that are not scalable may face high risk of failure when pursued without enough funding. Such projects face significant fixed costs, leading to high operational leverage and, thus, higher risk (Lambrecht et al., 2014) . The level of risk is then magnified when undertaken without sufficient initial funding. As such, the KIA model is relatively more attractive to backers that can still gain utility in a partially funded project in form of a qualitatively reduced product.
Likewise, KIA models are more attractive if the project has little fixed costs to spread over backers, since such a project can remain profitable even with only a few backers.
H3 (Scalable Projects):
Projects that are scalable and/or have lower fixed costs are more likely to use the Keep-It-All (KIA) model.
Given these predictions of the choice of funding models, entrepreneurs will never pursue riskier AON campaign strategies unless the average success level associated with the riskier campaign strategy is higher. If success were, on average, higher under KIA campaigns, then entrepreneurs would never select AON campaigns, because there is no reward for the extra risk taken. In contrast, we expect KIA projects to be less successful, since the crowd bears the risk of an entrepreneurial firm undertaking a project that is underfunded and, hence, more likely to fail.
In equilibrium, if entrepreneurs are risk averse, they will use the riskier AON method only for projects where success is much more likely.
H4 (Risk-Averse Entrepreneur):
All-Or-Nothing campaigns are, on average, more likely to be successful than Keep-It-All campaigns.
The risks entrepreneurs face in terms of an underfunded AON project are much more pronounced than an underfunded KIA project. As such, we expect entrepreneurs to spend more effort and expense (in terms of money and time) on signals of quality to the crowd. These expenses are primarily in the form of soft information, such as longer catch phrases, photos, having a video pitch, and longer yet easier-to-read project descriptions. Furthermore, we would expect AON entrepreneurs to have invested more time in developing a social network presence in order to lower the probability of and expected cost associated with an underfunded project.
H5 (Soft Information):
Entrepreneurs pursuing riskier campaign strategies will make more use of soft information to mitigate the uncertainty faced by the crowd.
In testing these hypotheses, we control for other factors that can affect crowdfunding success,
including, but not limited to, the information provided by the entrepreneur and the level and structure of the rewards. The level of information provided prior to the fundraising campaign may, of course, likewise affect the probability of success. Where it is difficult or costly for the entrepreneur to provide information that is more than mere cheap talk, campaigns that offer more information (such as having a video and not merely a textual description of the project)
are more likely to be successful.
The level of the reward and the number of reward scales can further affect the probability of success. We expect that campaigns with more reward scales are more likely to succeed, since these campaigns are more likely to match preferences of the crowd, due to the broader variation in the amount that can be invested and the reward to be received.
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Our dataset was extracted directly from the Indiegogo website. Data were collected page by page in October 2013. On Indiegogo, all finished projects stay visible on the website, regardless of whether they are successful or not, as long as the total amount pledged is at least 500 USD/EUR/CAD/AUD/GBP. Our initial sample consisted of all of the 47,139 finished campaigns that took place from the very beginning of Indiegogo in 2008 until October 2013. Computerautomated data collection, however, led to a loss of less than 5% of data, due to missing or erroneous key values or inconsistency in data provided on the Indiegogo website. There is no evidence that these missing data were linked to specific project characteristics; therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that these missing projects were randomly distributed and that our sample is a good representation of the full population of projects launched on Indiegogo.
Since the database includes projects with five different currencies, we convert all monetary values (goal, pledge, rewards) in USD to make them comparable. The exchange rate is the yearly average exchange rate (for campaigns lasting between 2 years, the ending date was retained). We excluded 5,727 campaigns that took place between 2008 and November 2011, since the choice between the AON and KIA model was only introduced in December 2011 and, thus, our hypotheses could not be tested on these campaigns. Following previous empirical research on crowdfunding (Mollick, 2014a; Qiu, 2013) , we excluded projects with a fundraising goal under $5,000 (after conversion of all values into $). Such projects typically rely for the most part on money from family, friends, and relatives, and, thus, cannot be compared with projects relying on backers (i.e., the crowd) outside the close network of the entrepreneur. We also excluded projects with a goal higher than $200,000, which corresponds to the 99 th percentile of our distribution. Indeed, some projects had very large fundraising goals (12 projects had a goal higher or equal to $10m). Consistent with the approach adopted by Mollick (2014a) for Kickstarter data, we considered these few observations as outliers, distinct from the traditional type of projects proposed on the platform. Our final sample was composed of 22,850 campaigns. A full description of variables available in our dataset is provided in Appendix Table I . Variables are classified in 3 types: project characteristics, soft information provided at the beginning of the campaign, and campaign output.
The recorded project characteristics are mandatory information and prior to the campaign start, all entrepreneurs set them once and for all. While some variables are intrinsic to the project itself (the category/subcategory, the location), others are set freely by the entrepreneur: the goal, the funding model, the number of rewards, and the level of each reward (i.e., the amount a backer should give to choose the defined reward), the duration, etc.
The additional "soft" information is a set of descriptive information provided to inform the crowd about the project. It consists of text, pictures, video pitches, possibly additional comments and updates, as well as any other information that the entrepreneur discloses to potential backers. As these pieces of information are mostly of qualitative nature, we limited ourselves to those that could be measured quantitatively. For instance, information such as the number of words/pictures/items and the presence or not of some items allowed us to observe the implication of the entrepreneur in his/her project and its degree of preparedness, as it is associated with success (Mollick, 2014a) .
Given that this information is intended to a wide audience reading, we also include a readability index as a control variable for evaluating crowd perception. Readability indexes are designed to gauge the understandability of a written text. We use the Automated Readability Index (ARI).
This index uses the full text of project description, as described in Appendix Finally, we consider campaign outputs based on observable information at the end of the campaign. These output measures consist of the total amount pledged by backers, the total number of backers, and the completion ratio. These output measures define the success of the campaign. We define the variable Completion Ratio as the ratio of the total amount pledged over the goal set by the entrepreneur. Our primary measure of success is a dummy variable called Success Dummy, which equals 1, if the Completion Ratio is equal or greater than 1, and 0 otherwise. Figure I shows the distribution of the Completion Ratio for AON and KIA (up to a value of 2) and highlights that the distribution is highly weighted on 0 and 1. The shape of this distribution lends support to our decision to use a dummy variable as our primary measure of campaign success. In unreported analysis, we considered the Completion Ratio as an alternative dependent variable to the Success Dummy, and our obtained conclusions are qualitatively similar. Thus, we do not report them below.
[ Figure I About Here]
As shown in Table I Panel A, 56.2% of the projects in our final sample belong to the creative category, 13.3% to the innovative category and 30.5% to the social category. The AON model is becoming increasingly popular and now represents more than 5% of new campaigns (Panel A).
Especially innovative projects are choosing the AON model more often. and is equal to $1 in 19% of the cases, while only 12% of the KIA campaigns have a first reward equal to $1 (not reported in Table I ).
All verified not-for-profit organizations (the variable Verified Non-profit) use the KIA model, suggesting that this form of fundraising constitutes a typical way non-profit organizations raise money on a regular basis (under the motto "any money is welcome"). Supporting Hypothesis H1, AON projects show, on average, 53% higher capital goals than KIA (and a 65% higher median). With an average of 2 team members, team size is not statistically different between the two subsamples.
As the risk of not collecting any funds is higher for an AON campaign, it seems that entrepreneurs provide more information to increase their chances to attract more backers, consistent with H5. Indeed, project descriptions are longer (the variable Full Text Length) and easier to read and more pictures and video pitches are provided. There is no difference in the 7 The Fixed Costs Dummy variable is equal to 1, if the project description mentions a term related to fixed costs, and equal to 0 otherwise. The first step to constructing this variable was to create a dictionary with all the words related to fixed costs. We made a random selection of 114 projects (0.5%) weighted by categories and by funding models. We then read the full text of every project in the selection, referencing every term related to any kind of costs mentioned in the text. Each co-author then went through the list and selected words related to fixed costs. We then compared and discussed our list to finally agree on a restricted set of words related to some fixed costs. Finally, we used the full description's text of campaigns to calculate a dummy variable for each project. More details on the list of terms kept for coding fixed costs are provided in Appendix Table I. number of external social network pages available for both types of project, suggesting that setting up a page on a social network requires little effort to generate extra information. This can also be explained by the fact that social networks are a base constituent of crowdfunding and, thus, considered by a majority of entrepreneurs as a must-do before even starting the crowdfunding campaign itself.
Outcomes also differ between subsamples. AON campaigns seem to be more successful (54% versus 32% for KIA campaigns) and attract almost 3 times more backers, providing support for the hypothesis H4. This difference in success will be confirmed in the multivariate analysis provided in the next section. H3 and H1, we consider that the decision between KIA and AON will depend on some characteristics intrinsic to the project that exist before the campaign launch, including the category of the project and the goal amount of the funding campaign. We also expect some other pre-existing variables to have an impact on this choice such as the number of different rewards the entrepreneur is able to offer, the size of the team leading the project, and the profit purpose of the project. The first method used is a probit regression, since our dependent variable is binary.
RESULTS

Choice of AON versus KIA Crowdfunding Models
Most likely, the goal of the campaign is set at the same time as the one for the funding model and is, therefore, linked. This causes a problem of endogeneity between our goal variable and the Keep-It-All dummy, as these decisions are simultaneous. Indeed, the campaign goal is primarily determined by real needs, though most likely adjusted for strategic purposes that are based on the desire to signal commitment and also based on expectations of the entrepreneur about his/her capability to attract the crowd's interest. To control for the endogeneity of the goal amount, we chose to use two-step (IV-probit) regressions to solve this problem, which is our second method of analysis. We use a two-step estimation methodology, in which the first equation estimates the ln(Goal) and the second equation the choice of funding model (Keep-ItAll Dummy). Since our dependent variable in the second step is binary, we estimate our equations using IV-probit regressions.
Moreover, all our models control for fixed effects due to the country of origin of the project initiator, the project category, and the semester of campaign launch. Table VI shows results for our regressions under various specifications.
[ Table VI About Here]
Our explanatory variables of interest are the scalability measures (H3) and the logarithm of goal (H1). As discussed, we use two different measures of scalability: the Digital Output Dummy that proxies for output scalability and the Fixed Costs Dummy that proxies for costs scalability.
Given the definition of these variables, we expect from H3 a positive impact for the first measure but a negative impact for the second one. As shown in Table VI , the digital output variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that digital projects are 37.9% more likely to use KIA in Model 1, which is strongly consistent with H3. In Model 2, the presence of fixed costs reduces the probability of KIA by 23.2%, which is again significant at the 1% level and consistent with H3. Further, as expected (H1), the data indicate that the impact of the ln(Goal) is negative and statistically significant, such that a 1-standard deviation increase in the ln(Goal) gives rise to a 13.5% increase in the probability of the use of AON. Similarly, the coefficient on Reward Levels is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, whereby a 1-standard deviation increase in Reward Levels gives rise to an 11.3% increase in the probability of the use of AON, consistent with H2. Note that we have carried out several robustness checks that are not reported in the tables for succinctness (but available on request from the authors)
but that control for rewards in different, other ways, including the size of the smallest reward.
These alternative measures do not alter our conclusions.
The data further indicate that team size is positively associated with using KIA, such that a 1-standard deviation increase in team size increases the probability of using KIA by 5.2%. One possible reason could be that team size proxies for firm size and larger firms may be more able to start an underfunded project.
We now turn to the two-step IV-probit regressions (Models 3 to 6 in Table VI ). The first-stage regression in Model 3 used to estimate the goal is based on two instrumental variables (IVs) that are linked to the goal of the project but are independent of the decision of the funding model. The first IV is the median goal of successful projects in the same subcategory in the semester prior to the campaign launch, and the second is the median completion ratio for projects within the same subcategory for the semester prior to the campaign launch. We present statistics in Table VI that show these are statistically valid instruments. In terms of the intuition, these variables for the median previous period's goal size of the same subcategory and the median previous period's completion ratio of the same subcategory are likely to affect the goal levels selected by current entrepreneurs seeking crowdfunding. It would be unusual for an entrepreneur to have a vastly different goal amount than a similar, successful entrepreneur in a prior period, unless a similar entrepreneur in the prior period was unsuccessful in achieving that goal. We obtain that higher goals set by previously successful for the estimation of the second regressions (Models 4 and 6). The results observed in Table VI confirm what we saw in the first probit specification, in terms of the statistical significance, and show similar economic significance. In short, even if we only partly deal with endogeneity in these tests, the findings are very stable under different specifications and, hence, we do not have reason to believe that the results are being significantly affected by endogeneity.
In addition to these regressions, we created some tests to address concerns about the validity of our IV probit methodology. The first test of endogeneity follows the specification of Durbin-
Wu-Haussmann testing the difference between the two estimates. The null hypothesis tests if the regressor of interest (the variable ln(Goal)) is exogenous. As the null hypothesis is rejected
in our tests, the variable ln(Goal) is indeed endogenous, and, thus, ordinary probit estimates are inconsistent. The IV-probit estimates are, therefore, appropriate. The second test checks whether or not the instruments are weakly correlated with our endogenous variable. Based on F-statistics values of our first stage, we can assume that our instruments are not weak. We can compare the values with the minimal recommended value of 11.59 for two IVs in Stock et al. (2002) . The third test computes the Amemiya-Lee-Newey score test of over-identifying restrictions. This test performs for over-identification (exogeneity of IVs) following the procedure described by Lee (1992) . Our results show that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and, thus, our instruments are valid.
Outcome of Crowdfunding Campaigns
Tables VII-VIII examine factors that affect the outcome of crowdfunding campaigns in terms of the probability of success for the campaign. The baseline specifications are presented in Table   VII . The data indicate that KIA campaigns are significantly less successful on average (17.5% less successful in the full sample in Model 1 and 16.3% in Model 2), and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. But this effect varies in the different subsamples in the data. For the subsample of digital output projects (Model 3), KIA is 20.3% less successful, while for non-digital output projects (Model 4), KIA projects are 13.6% less likely (significant at the 1% level) to be successful, consistent with H4. These findings are consistent with the use of fixed costs as alternative proxy for scalability (Models 5 and 6), as well as subsamples of projects with and without fixed costs (Models 7 and 8), and subsamples of projects with digital and non-digital output (Models 9 and 10).
[ Table VII About Here]
The data presented in Table VII for the sample of all projects in Model 1, and this effect is similar in the other models in Table   VII . In line with previous research (Mollick, 2014a; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2014) , duration is negatively and significantly associated with success in all models. A 1-standard deviation increase in duration gives rise to a 12.6% reduction in the probability of success.
According to Table II , there is, on average, a significant difference in project size between KIA and AON. Since the goal is a key variable of our hypotheses by impacting the decision for the funding model, and since the goal is also a determinant of the completion ratio--and by extension, the success dummy, which is our dependent variable--we wanted to be sure that the difference in the goals between subsamples was not affecting our results. Using a propensity score matching methodology (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) , we are able to weight projects in the AON subsample to match more closely with the average size of projects between both subsamples. This methodology links all the KIA projects one by one with the closest AON project (we match projects based on goal, category, and campaign start date). In the process, since there are more KIA projects, all AON projects must have at least one KIA equivalent but can be matched with more than one KIA project. At the end of the matching process, we found a number of observations equivalent in both subsamples (with duplicated AON projects that matched more than one a KIA project).
[ Table VIII About Here]
After running the same regression models presented in Table VII on the new matched samples, we were able to confirm that the sign and statistical significance of our results are very robust.
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The findings with matched samples are reported in Table VIII relative to Table VII. [ Table IX About Here]
Soft Information Disclosure and Entrepreneurial Risk
In Table IX , we examine the impact of risk taken by the entrepreneur on the amount of soft information provided. We consider that the entrepreneur incurs a higher risk of not getting any funding in the AON model and that this risk is proportional to the goal: the higher the goal, the higher the risk of not receiving any funding (thus, the variable Risk for the Entrepreneur, which corresponds to the interaction between AON and Goal, as defined in Appendix Table I ). and 5 for innovative and creative projects, respectively, the effect is likewise significant at the 1% level, and the economic significance is more pronounced relative to that for the average project in Model 1. Overall, the data to text length and the risk for the entrepreneur are strongly consistent with H5.
Table IX Models 6-10 provide analogous regressions to Models 1-5 with the difference in terms of the dependent variable being the ARI score in Models 6-10. A higher ARI score means that the text is more complicated (more characters per word and more words per sentence; see Appendix Table I for the formula). Table IX shows that the higher the risk for the entrepreneur, the lower the readability score (the text is easier to read for a greater number of people), as expected (H5). This effect is significant at the 1% level in Models 6, 7, and 10 for the full sample, the subset of projects where the goal is less than the median, and the creative subsample, respectively. This effect is significant at the 10% level in Models 8 and 9 for the subset of projects where the goal is greater than the median and the subset of innovative projects, respectively. The economic significance is such that a 1-standard deviation increase in the risk for the entrepreneur is associated with a 0.5% reduction in the readability index for the average project in Model 6. This effect is approximately twice as large for the subset of projects, where the goal is less than the median in Model 7 and 25% lower for the subset of projects, where the goal is greater than the median in Model 8. This effect is similar to the average for the subset of innovative projects in Model 9 and 36% more pronounced for the subset of creative projects in Model 10.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Thanks to the emergence of Internet platforms, crowdfunding has become accessible to a large number of entrepreneurs as an alternative form of funding. While the standardization in crowdfunding platforms offers clear benefits in terms of comparability across projects and readability, it also reduces the extent to which entrepreneurs can tailor their offer according to their specific needs. One important dimension of standardization has been the adoption of AON and KIA models by the major reward-based platforms. The choice of model clearly affects the fee structure paid by the entrepreneurs (since the platforms charge different fees) and how pledges are transformed into funding for the entrepreneur.
In this paper, we compared the AON versus the KIA models in terms of the types of companies that used these methods of raising capital, their disclosures, and their success. An analysis of the Indiegogo platform offers a unique opportunity to examine the choice between the two forms of crowdfunding models, as the platform offers entrepreneurs the option to choose between the two models along with the fundraising goal of their project. Our findings offer support to the prediction that AON models offer a guarantee to the crowd that the entrepreneur does not start a project with unrealistically low funding. In contrast, the KIA model is a useful model for entrepreneurs who can scale their business. Overall, AON fundraising campaigns involved substantially larger capital goals and were much more likely to be successful at achieving their goals. Further, we showed that the marginal effects associated with information related by AON fundraisers were much more pronounced than that for KIA fundraisers. These findings are robust to controls for self-selection and endogeneity and robust to propensity score matching.
In terms of implications for platforms, these findings offer support that providing flexibility to entrepreneurs, in terms of having a choice of funding model, may be an interesting selling point for platforms and a way to differentiate themselves in this rapidly growing market. This may also explain the success of Indiegogo (the major platform that offers this choice), since many entrepreneurs may prefer to raise funds on Indiegogo precisely because of the possibility to opt for the KIA model. The fact that this platform offers this choice magnifies the signaling effect of AON, compared to other platforms such as Kickstarter, where this choice is not possible (and thus cannot be a 'signal' mechanism).
Our study offers avenues for future research, such as determining the chances for the success of projects themselves, beyond the campaign success. Our analysis examined success during the fundraising campaign but is silent about what happens afterwards. For instance, Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) report that 75% of projects successfully funded on Kickstarter deliver late. However, based on conclusions offered in our study, one might expect that this percentage varies according to the fundraising model (KIA versus AON) used during the campaign, since the latter is related to the amount raised. Indeed, projects that are started with sufficient funds are more likely to produce the promised product and eventually deliver on time, something that is worth investigating in future research. A related issue in future work might involve an examination of the publicity surrounding crowdfunding under different funding models, and an assessment of different ways to measure project quality.
Another worthwhile research question is whether certain models are more prone to fraud.
Indeed, concerns have recently been raised by regulators and academics (Griffin, 2012; Hildebrand, Puri and Rocholl, 2013; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2014a ) that crowdfunding simply shifts risk to the crowd, and that some entrepreneurs may exploit an unsophisticated crowd. In the context studied here, one can extend the analysis by seeing whether projects funded with a KIA model are more prone to lead to fraud in the event of underfunding. 
